Meet Constantine – Find Mythos-level vulnerabilities in your code. It proves them, patches them, PRs them back. Autonomously.

Google Cloud IAM: Designs for Self-Service Privilege Escalation

GNC-IAM

In a perfect world, all organizations would incorporate security into their cloud environments from the start. Unfortunately, common development practices tend to postpone the implementation of security controls in the product environment in favor of shipping product features. The reasons for this are manifold: an early-stage product may ignore robust security processes in favor of […]

Cloud Security and Architecture: The 8 Pillars

Praetorian has created a 8-pillar framework to simplify the assessment of multi-cloud environments across a broad client base. Together with proven methodologies for enterprise and product security, the framework provides a holistic approach to securing organizations from chip to cloud.

Secure and Scalable Secrets Management in the Cloud for DevOps

Regardless of industry, size, or tech stack, modern organizations rely on secrets to operate their infrastructure. Increasingly, DevOps teams elect to build or migrate their infrastructure with the cloud. All too often, secure and scalable secret management strategies are forced onto the backlog for the sake of development velocity or underappreciated implications. Ad hoc secret management strategies can have disastrous implications – as application security weaknesses can readily metastasize into complete infrastructure compromise. With increasing complexity and modernization, DevOps operators need a standard method for managing and maintaining secrets within modern environments.

Cloud Data Exfiltration via GCP Storage Buckets and How to Prevent It

On a recent engagement, we gained the ability to execute code on a pod which we compromised through a SQL injection vulnerability. With the SQL injection, we could write pickled python objects to a table in a database and those objects would be unpickled and executed by a different pod. The customer was using a Private Kubernetes GKE cluster and had restricted all egress traffic to pass through a network proxy which denied general access to the Internet. This prevents standard exfiltration of data from the pod. However, the pods had permissions to write to GCP Storage Buckets, and therefore, the storage.cloud.google.com URL was whitelisted.